

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS 102532-h

15 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: NIE 11-57: SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1962**

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was scheduled by the IAC as part of its regular program (IAC-D-1/19). Its scope is similar to that of NIE 11-5-55, AIR DEFENSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955-1960, dated 12 July 1955, which it will supersede.
2. The estimate was prepared by the committee method, a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure, but one which is probably desirable for a highly technical, complex estimate dealing with specialized contributions from all three military services and several IAC subcommittees. Actual time spent in its preparation was about six months.

SUBSTANCE

3. Conclusions of special interest in this paper are noted in an attachment to this memorandum.
4. Contentious points which have been resolved by the Board and IAC representatives include: the current and future strength

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

and composition of the Bloc's fighter forces; future operational deployment of Bloc radars; the effect of guided missiles on existing weapon systems; Bloc air defense personnel strengths; and radar detection capabilities. The three remaining reservations are:

Paragraph 16: State reserves, desiring to add language to the effect that the increasing difficulty and costliness of providing adequate air defense might lead Soviet planners to reduce the priority given to active air defense and to rely more heavily on deterrent power to ensure the security of the Bloc. We consider that this would represent such a radical departure from past Soviet emphasis on defense of the homeland that such a possibility should not be raised in the absence of some fairly clear indication of a change.

Paragraph 19: Air Force reserves, wishing to eliminate reference to VNQS as an organization. This reflects a long, inter-service squabble over the precise administrative and command channels in the Soviet armed forces, a question which remains unclear. The wording of the text represents our attempt to tell the reader what groups are involved in Soviet air defense without fighting the question of exactly who does what to whom.

- 2 -
TOP SECRET

Paragraphs 76 and 77: Air Force dissents, based on a difference in technical judgment registered in the Guided Missiles paper three months ago. There has been no new evidence on this subject, and we have simply carried the dissent forward.

5. A Post-Mortem on this estimate and Validity Study on NIE 11-5-55 are appended for IAC consideration.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

ONE:HStoertz
Cys 1, 2, 3 - DDI for DCI, DDCI, DDI
Cy 4 - Mr. Kent
Cy 5 - General Bull
Cy 6 - Mr. Stoertz
Cy 7 - Sec. , IAC
Cy 8 - Reading Room
Cys 9, 10 - Chief, Estimates Staff ✓
Cy 11 - File
16

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Attachment to
TS 102332-h

**NIE 11-57: SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
THROUGH MID-1962**

Conclusions of Special Interest

Conclusion 8: Moscow's defense concentration is so unique as to warrant a separate conclusion. The level of defense suggests an attempt to deny penetration to the target area by any attacking force.

Conclusion 9: This recognizes the great difficulty the Bloc would have in defending peripheral areas from air attacks.

Conclusion 11: This is the first estimate on Bloc military programs to have a conclusion regarding the probable effect of guided missiles on existing weapon systems.

Conclusion 14: Significance is self-evident.

TOP SECRET